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Dialogic	education	programmes	that	integrate	thinking	through	dialogue	within	the	
curriculum	such	as	Thinking	Together	and	Alexander’s	approach	of	Dialogic	Teaching	are	
clearly	intended	to	promote	general	thinking	strategies,	skills	and	dispositions	as	well	as	any	
other	goals	that	they	might	have	such	as	oracy	skills	and	curriculum	learning.		Recent	
surveys	of	evaluation	studies	in	the	area	have	even	suggested	that	dialogic	education	might	
be	the	most	effective	way	of	teaching	for	general	thinking	skills	and	dispositions	(Clarke	et	al	
2016,	Resnick	and	Schantz,	2015).		However,	if	we	take	the	dialogic	theory	that	lies	behind	
dialogic	education	seriously,	then	this	has	important	implications	for	how	we	understand	
what	thinking	is	and	therefore	what	teaching	thinking	means.	Thinking,	or,	more	specifically	
the	kind	of	socially	valued	thinking	that	many	teachers	and	researchers	want	to	promote	in	
education,	looks	rather	different	through	a	dialogic	theory	lens	than	the	kind	of	general	
thinking	skills	and	dispositions	originally	aimed	at	by	the	teaching	thinking	movement.		The	
idea	of	a	discrete	cognitive	skill,	for	example,	now	becomes	an	aspect	of	situated	dialogues	
and	intellectual	dispositions	are	translated	as	aspects	of	relationships	within	cultures.	In	this	
chapter	I	will	explore	what	dialogic	theory	has	to	say	about	what	it	means	to	teach	for	
thinking,	looking	first	at	what	it	has	to	say	about	learning	and	teaching	in	general,	then	
about	what	it	has	to	say	about	thinking	and	learning	to	think.	Finally,	I	draw	these	different	
strands	together	into	a	coherent	dialogic	theory	of	how	we	can	teach	for	thinking	by	
opening,	widening,	deepening	and	sustaining	dialogic	spaces	and	dialogic	space.	
	
What	is	a	dialogue?	
Imagine	if	we	were	to	get	two	robots	–	or	chatterbots	–	each	programmed	to	respond	to	
words	and	categories	of	words	with	pre-prepared	utterances	and	we	made	them	interact,	
the	results	might	look	externally	like	a	dialogue	but	it	would	not	actually	be	one.	Some	so-
called	dialogues	in	social	life	can	be	a	bit	like	that.	It	is	quite	possible	for	people	to	falsely	
claim	‘we	are	having	a	dialogue’	when	they	are	just	talking	at	each	other	or	talking	past	each	
other.	Fortunately	we	know	when	social	interaction	is	not	real	dialogue	because	we	all	know	
the	experience	of	engaging	in	a	real	dialogue.	Real	dialogues	happen	when	people	listen	to	
each	other	and	learn	from	each	other.	Real	dialogues	tend	to	feel	exciting	and	enjoyable.	
One	way	to	characterise	real	dialogues,	so	as	to	distinguish	them	from	mere	external	
interaction	of	the	robot	kind,	is	to	point	out	that	in	a	real	dialogue	shared	thinking	occurs	
such	that	it	is	not	always	possible	to	say	who	is	thinking.	One	could	say	that	in	a	real	
dialogue	there	is	no	longer	just	‘I	am	thinking’	and	‘you	are	thinking’	but	there	is	also	the	
experience	that	‘we	are	thinking	together’.	But	the	idea	of	‘we’	thinking	might	not	be	quite	
right,	it	might	not	even	go	far	enough.	The	experience	of	dialogue,	especially	dialogue	about	
a	shared	interest,	can	also	be	of	a	kind	of	thinking	in	general	that	takes	hold	of	us	both	and	
carries	us	along	further	than	we	might	have	thought	possible.	Describing	this	experience	
Merleau-Ponty	writes	of	a	successful	dialogue	that:		
Life	becomes	ideas	and	the	ideas	return	to	life,	each	is	caught	up	in	the	vortex	in	which	
he	first	committed	only	measured	stakes,	each	is	led	on	by	what	he	said	and	the	
response	he	received,	led	on	by	his	own	thought	of	which	he	is	no	longer	the	sole	
thinker.	(Merleau-Ponty	1968,	119;	1964,	159)	
I	find	the	concept	of	entanglement	as	this	has	been	developed	in	quantum	theory	useful	as	
a	way	of	thinking	about	what	happens	to	voices	in	dialogue.	Entanglement,	perhaps	the	key	
defining	concept	of	quantum	physics	(SchrÖdinger,	1935)	occurs	when	pairs	or	groups	of	
particles	interact	in	ways	such	that	the	quantum	state	of	each	particle	cannot	be	described	
independently	of	the	others,	even	when	the	particles	are	separated	by	a	large	distance	but	
instead,	a	quantum	state	must	be	described	for	the	system	as	a	whole.	In	dialogues	voices	
become	entangled2.	And	not	just	human	voices	but	also	objects	and	domains	of	knowledge	
can	become	entangled	within	dialogues.	
One	way	to	understand	the	entanglement	involved	in	dialogues	is	through	the	kind	of	
circularity	of	reference	that	Rommetveit	refers	to,	quoting	Barwise	and	Perry,	as	
‘attunement	to	the	attunement	of	the	other’	(Rommetveit,	1992).	In	communications	
theory,	Rommetveit	points	out,	messages	go	one-way	from	a	sender	to	a	receiver,	whereas	
in	a	dialogue	the	process	is	more	circular.	The	‘other’	is	always	already	on	the	inside	of	every	
utterance.	This	is	because	each	utterance	responds	to	what	the	other	has	said	in	a	way	
intended	to	relate	to	the	other.	This	model	of	dialogic	inter-subjectivity	through	mutual	
attunement	needs	to	be	extended	to	include	apparently	non-human	voices,	the	voice	of	
Mathematics	for	example.	We	know	in	education	that	an	area	of	discourse	like	Mathematics	
																																								 																				
2	This	could	just	be	a	useful	metaphor	borrowed	from	another	strand	of	science	-	or	it	might	refer	to	a	
hypothesis	about	the	nature	of	thought	and	of	dialogues	on	the	material	level	of	analysis	–	time	will	tell.	
can	appear	external	and	static	or	can	enter	inside	a	learner	to	become	a	living	voice	(Cobb	
and	Hodge,	2010).		
Every	theorist	who	can	be	referred	to	as	dialogic	addresses	the	entanglement	aspect	of	
dialogue,	but	each	do	so	in	different	ways.	Bakhtin	explicitly	links	dialogue	to	learning	
through	his	concept	of	the	‘internally	persuasive	discourse’	(Bakhtin,	1981,	p376).	
Authoritative	discourse,	he	writes,	remains	‘outside’	us	and	remains	static	in	meaning.	You	
either	accept	it	or	reject	it	but	you	can’t	engage	with	it.	In	contrast	the	internally	persuasive	
word	or	discourse	is	one	that	enters	inside	you	as	if	it	was	one	of	our	own	words,	it	is	‘half	
ours	half	someone	else’s’	and	so	it	is	able	to	re-organise	our	words	from	within	and	also	to	
engender	new	words	and	new	ideas.		
In	a	similar	way	Buber	contrasts	the	objectifying	‘I-it’	attitude	that	turns	the	other	into	an	
object	to	the	the	‘i-thou’	attitude	that	engages	responsively	with	the	subjectivity	of	the	
other.	The	‘I-thou’	attitude	leads	to	entanglement	which	Buber	characterises	with	a	spatial	
metaphor,	the	space	between	or	simply	‘the	between’	(‘Zwischen’,	Buber,	1958).	Buber	
extends	the	apparent	inter-subjectivity	of	the	I-thou	relation	to	include	relationships	with	
non-human	subjects	such	as	‘God’	and	also	non-human	objects	such	as	trees.	This	extension	
of	dialogic	relationships	beyond	human	voices	is	found	in	Bakhtin	who	remarked	‘I	hear	
voices	in	everything’	and	is	important	to	educational	dialogic	theory.	
	
What	is	dialogic	space?	
Dialogic	means	seeing	things	(or	feeling	things	or	thinking	things)	from	at	least	two	points	of	
view	at	once.	Monologic	means	only	acknowledging	one	correct	point	of	view	as	if	
everything	was	visible	all	at	once	laid	out	flat	on	a	table	in	front	of	us.	It	is	only	through	
entering	into	dialogue	that	ideas	change	and	new	perspectives	can	be	taken	on	board.	To	
enter	into	dialogue	with	each	other,	ideas3	need	to	move	into	a	shared	space	where	they	
can	resonate	together,	merge	in	some	ways,	clash	in	others	and	stimulate	the	emergence	of	
new	ideas.	This	shared	space	of	mutual	resonance	is	‘dialogic	space’	and	without	it	there	is	
no	real	dialogue	and	no	real	learning.	
																																								 																				
3	Ideas	here	are	not	assumed	to	be	non-material	but	rather	parts	of	the	visible,	tangible,	audible	world	that	
turn	back	upon	it	to	reflect	it.	Just	like	words	and	gestures,	signs	all	have	a	material	aspect.	
An	article	I	wrote	with	Neil	Mercer	introduced	the	idea	of	dialogic	space	into	our	analysis	of	
classroom	talk	(Wegerif	and	Mercer,	1997).	The	issue	at	the	time	was	how	to	understand	
social	cognition	in	the	way	in	which	the	upper	primary	children	(aged	8	to	11)	were	talking	
together	in	small	groups.	There	seemed	to	be	at	least	three	significant	types	of	talk,	
disputational	talk	when	children	disagreed	with	each	other	without	giving	reasons,	
cumulative	talk	when	they	agreed	without	reasons	and	‘exploratory	talk’	where	they	
genuinely	engaged	with	each	other’s	ideas.	We	realised	that	each	type	of	talk	reflected	an	
intersubjective	orientation	related	to	a	form	of	individual	identification.	In	disputational	talk	
children	identified	with	their	own	self-image	or	ego	and	each	wanted	to	be	the	one	to	win	
the	game	and	get	the	answer	and	in	cumulative	talk	children	identified	with	their	image	of	
the	group	as	a	harmonious	unit	and	so	did	hot	want	to	criticise.	This	seemed	clear	but	then	
we	asked	ourselves,	what	is	the	form	of	identification	involved	with	‘exploratory	talk’?	A	key	
feature	of	exploratory	talk	is	being	able	to	change	one’s	mind.	The	question	then	was,	from	
what	position	is	it	that	individual	children	are	able	to	look	at	what	they	have	said,	find	it	
wrong	and	so	change	their	minds?	This	way	of	thinking	about	this	practical	issue	led	me	to	
introduce	the	idea	of	identification	with	a	‘space	of	dialogue’	or	‘dialogic	space’	as	a	key	part	
of	learning	to	think	(Wegerif,	2007).	Many	years	before	this	I	had	read	and	been	inspired	by	
Buber’s	‘I	and	Thou’	(1958)	and,	although	I	was	not	fully	aware	of	this	at	the	time,	I	can	now	
see	that	the	idea	of	dialogic	space	opening	up	in	classrooms	is	an	applied	version	of	Buber’s	
concept	of	the	Between.		
While	Buber’s	‘Between’	is	always	referred	to	as	if	it	was	an	abstract	notion,	the	idea	of	
dialogic	space	has	a	material	aspect.	Dialogic	spaces	can	be	felt	to	open	up	and	to	close	
down	at	specific	times	that	could	potentially	be	recorded.		We	saw	the	material	side	of	
dialogic	space	recently	in	a	classroom	where	a	group	of	three	upper	primary	children	were	
arguing	about	a	puzzle	presented	in	a	tablet.	Not	only	did	their	body	language	converge	on	
this	central	focus	but	so	did	their	fingers.	Each	put	their	hand	on	the	tablet	to	point	out	
what	they	thought	the	key	aspect	of	the	puzzle	was	and	how	it	could	be	solved	through	
moving	the	pieces.	Pretty	soon	it	was	clear	that	much	of	the	shared	thinking	was	being	done	
by	their	fingers	(Wegerif	et	al	2017).	When	thinking	become	embodied	in	this	way	it	occurs	
in	a	shared	physical	space	and	creates	a	shared	dialogic	space	out	of	that	shared	physical	
space.	Merleau-Ponty	makes	a	similar	point	when	he	says	of	real	dialogue	‘No	one	thinks	
any	more,	everyone	speaks,	all	live	and	gesticulate	within	Being’	(Merleau-Ponty	1968,	pp.	
119;	1964,	159).	His	point	is	that	thought	moves	from	the	idea	we	might	have	that	it	is	
something	individual	occurring	silently	in	separated	brains	to	being	something	shared	
because	audible	in	a	shared	space	where	the	words	and	gestures	and	intonation	and	body	
language	carries	the	shared	thinking.	
In	this	sense	dialogic	space	is	similar	to	the	notion	of	a	‘blended	space’.	‘Blended	space’	is	a	
new	term	for	using	augmented	reality	to	link	objects	in	a	physical	space	with	digital	objects	
in	a	digital	space	(Wu	et	al,	2013).	In	augmented	reality	the	blend	is	usually	a	simple	match	
between	physical	space	and	digital	space.	A	park	bench	in	physical	space	might	be	blended	
with	a	Pokemon	Go	monster	in	virtual	space	such	that,	with	the	right	glasses	or	smart	
phone,	the	monster	can	be	seen	sitting	on	the	bench.	In	dialogic	space	the	blend	is	more	
complex	since	it	is	between	physical	space-time	on	one	side	and	on	the	other	the	open-
ended	cultural	space	of	ideas	where	all	ideas	are	embodied	and	all	forms	of	embodiment	
can	be	read	as	ideas.		
	
Let	me	explain	dialogic	space	using	a	café	table	as	an	illustration.	Before	dialogic	space	
opens	up	things	tend	to	be	thought	of	on	the	model	of	the	ontology	of	identity	(Wegerif,	
2008).	Identity	ontology	says	that	‘a	thing	is	what	it	is	and	not	another	thing’.	The	pepper	
and	salt	pots	plus	cutlery	on	the	café	table	are	just	pepper	and	salt	pots	plus	cutlery.	When	
dialogic	space	opens	then	material	things,	bodies,	hands,	voices,	gestures,	pixels	on	the	
screen,	become	signs	for	other	things	and	representative	of	voices	that	are	not	present.	
Depending	on	the	dialogue	the	pepper	pot	could	become	Lionel	Messy	scoring	a	goal	for	
Barcelona,	dribbling	brilliantly	around	the	salt	pot	and	into	a	goal	marked	out	by	knives	and	
forks,	or	the	two	pots	could	represent	the	relationship	between	a	proton	and	a	neutron	in	a	
hydrogen	atom	surrounded	by	an	electron	cloud	of	scattered	pepper	on	the	table	or	they	
could	stand	in	for	almost	anything	at	all.		
Although	all	dialogic	spaces	are	unique	due	to	their	context	they	also	share	something	in	
common	which	is	the	opening	of	the	space	itself.	While	in	practice	any	given	dialogic	space	
might	have	a	limited	range	of	themes	and	probable	outcomes	these	cannot	be	determined	
in	advance	because,	in	principle,	any	real	dialogue	opens	up	the	potential	for	infinite	
meaning.	This	is	just	another	way	of	saying	that	the	context	that	could	be	brought	into	any	
dialogue	is	unbounded.	In	practice	the	children	might	just	mention	references	from	the	TV	
that	they	saw	last	night	but	in	principle	anything	could	be	brought	to	bear	on	the	problem	at	
hand.	I	tend	to	refer	to	dialogic	space	rather	than	dialogic	spaces	in	order	to	draw	attention	
to	this	unity	of	the	structure	of	dialogic	space	as	always	opening	up	unbounded	contextual	
meaning	within	the	diversity	of	specific	contexts.	But,	of	course,	dialogic	spaces	are	also	all	
different	in	their	physical	location.	The	neologism	of	‘dialogic	space(s)’	would	be	the	most	
accurate	term	with	the	singular	‘space’	referring	to	the	unbounded	ideas	side	of	the	blend	
and	the	plural	‘spaces’	to	the	physical	concrete	side.		
It	is	important	to	have	a	notion	of	dialogic	space(s)	or	other	cognate	term	in	education	
(entanglement,	dialogic	flow,	intertextuality,	internal	relations	etc)	to	avoid	the	reduction	of	
dialogic	education	to	the	hegemony	of	the	external.	I	have	read	studies	that	refer	to	
‘dialogic’	in	education	in	an	entirely	external	way,	coding	each	utterance	and	trying	to	pin	
everything	down	to	the	visible	and	tangible	surface	of	things.	This	is	a	conceptual	confusion.	
Dialogue	is	interesting	because	of	its	dialogic	nature,	to	study	it	monologically	excludes	that	
essential	aspect.	The	only	reason	why	dialogue	works	and	is	in	fact	necessary	for	learning	is	
because	it	opens	up	an	invisible	space	of	potential	in	which	the	logic	of	the	surface	–	a	logic	
where	every	identity	is	fixed	and	separated,	in	its	proper	place	-		becomes	turned	inside	out	
such	that	the	surface	becomes	richly	resonant.	In	real	dialogue	you	are	part	of	me,	I	am	part	
of	you	and	we	together	are	part	of	the	surrounding	world.	Each	of	our	words	then	has	the	
potential	to	resonate	in	an	unbounded	way	and	so	to	bring	new	aspects	of	reality	into	
visibility	for	us	and	perhaps	also	to	bring	them	into	being	where	they	did	not	exist	before	as	
nameable	differences.	
What	is	thinking?	
Defining	thinking	is	inevitably	difficult	because	thinking	is	already	implied	behind	the	action	
of	defining.	The	task	of	understanding	thinking	is	a	bit	like	a	short	cartoon	I	recall	watching	
as	a	child	in	which	the	Pink	Panther	sucks	himself	up	entirely	in	a	vacuum	cleaner	that	he	
himself	is	holding	–	this	sucking	yourself	up	in	your	own	vacuum	cleaner	move	is	not	really	
possible	but	we	enjoy	imagining	it	as	if	it	was	possible.	
	
When	people	write	and	talk	about	‘teaching	thinking’	they	do	not	just	mean	teaching	any	
and	all	types	of	thinking	because	some	thinking	is	obviously	quite	bad.	They	mean	teaching	
‘good	thinking’	which	they	might	call	‘intelligence’	or	‘higher	order	thinking’	or	some	other	
technical	sounding	term	which	always	really	translates	most	accurately	as	‘the	kind	of	
thinking	that	we	do	not	think	we	see	enough	of	and	that	we	want	to	see	more	of’.	Since	this	
idea	of	good	thinking	is	dependent	on	a	social	context	one	sensible	research	strategy	to	find	
out	more	about	good	thinking	is	simply	to	ask	many	people	how	they	understand	this	
concept.	In	the	1980’s	Lauren	Resnick	chaired	a	US	government	enquiry	into	teaching	
thinking	in	the	USA	and	asked	many	expert	teachers	what	they	understood	by		‘Higher	
Order	Thinking’	of	the	kind	that	they	wanted	to	teach.	The	phrase	Higher	Order	Thinking	
and	Higher	Order	Thinking	Skills	comes	from	Bloom’s	taxonomy	(Bloom,	1956)	where	
‘higher’	skills	such	as	evaluation	and	synthesis	were	separated	from	‘lower’	skills	such	as	
‘memory’	and	‘reading’.	There	is	no	good	research	basis	for	this	distinction	but	in	this	study	
Resnick	is	not	really	using	Higher	Order	in	any	technical	sense,	she	simply	uses	it	in	a	way	
that	refers	to	the	kind	of	thinking	we	value	and	want	to	teach.	She	concluded	that	Higher	
Order	Thinking	was	hard	to	define	in	advance	because	it	was	surprising.	In	her	final	report	
she	wrote:	Thinking	skills	resist	the	precise	forms	of	definition	we	have	come	to	associate	
with	the	setting	of	specified	objectives	for	schooling.	Nevertheless,	it	is	relatively	easy	to	list	
some	key	features	of	higher	order	thinking.	When	we	do	this,	we	become	aware	that,	
although	we	cannot	define	it	exactly,	we	can	recognize	higher	order	thinking	when	it	occurs.	
The	following	are	all	characteristics	of	Higher	Order	Thinking	made	by	Resnick:		
• Higher	order	thinking	is	non-algorithmic.	That	is,	the	path	of	action	is	not	fully	
specified	in	advance.	Higher	order	thinking	tends	to	be	complex.	The	total	path	is	not	
“visible”	(mentally	speaking)	from	any	single	vantage	point.		
• Higher	order	thinking	often	yields	multiple	solutions,	each	with	costs	and	benefits,	
rather	than	unique	solutions.		
• Higher	order	thinking	involves	nuanced	judgment	and	interpretation.		
• Higher	order	thinking	involves	the	application	of	multiple	criteria,	which	sometimes	
conflict	with	one	another.		
• Higher	order	thinking	often	involves	uncertainty.	Not	everything	that	bears	on	the	
task	at	hand	is	known.		
• Higher	order	thinking	involves	imposing	meaning,	finding	structure	in	apparent	
disorder.		
(Resnick,	1987)		
Resnick	was	referring	to	thinking	as	something	that	individuals	do	when	she	wrote	these	
criteria,	in	keeping	with	the	dominant	assumptions	of	the	cognitive	psychology	of	that	time	
in	the	USA,	but	it	is	noticeable	that	these	points	could	equally	apply	to	dialogues	as	defined	
by	Bakhtin	(above).		
In	order	to	try	to	account	for	the	nature	and	origin	of	the	complex	and	surprising	thinking	
that	we	value	and	want	to	teach	more	of,	dialogic	theory	puts	forward	the	metaphor	of	
thinking	as	embodied	dialogue.	This	metaphor	is	offered	not	in	order	to	replace	all	the	other	
possible	metaphors	but	in	order	to	add	a	useful	new	voice	to	the	ongoing	dialogue.	
Educational	research	has	confirmed	that	the	metaphor	of	thinking	as	dialogue	is	a	fruitful	
one.	This	metaphor	lies	behind	programmes	that	have	been	successful	at	teaching	thinking.	
Bakhtin’s	clarification	that	dialogue	occurs	when	answers	give	rise	to	new	questions	
suggests	that	the	dialogue	we	refer	to	is	not	just	interaction	but	those	kinds	of	dynamic	
relationships	in	which	there	is	mutual	illumination	across	a	gap	of	difference.		
Considering	what	is	wrong	with	existing	and	previous	metaphors	for	thinking	in	cognitive	
psychology	can	help	us	to	understand	the	potential	value	of	the	metaphor	of	thinking	as	
dialogue.	I	am	thinking	here	of	behaviourism’s	metaphor	of	thinking	as	‘nothing	but	talking	
to	ourselves’	producing	sub-vocalisations	that	can	be	measured	as	behaviour	(Watson,	
1959)	or	the	metaphor	of	thinking	as	nothing	but	information	processing	using	a	machine	
code	programming	language	which	Pinker	referred	to	as	‘mentalese’	(Pinker,	1999)	and	now	
the	new	metaphor	of	thinking	as	nothing	but	neural	activity	in	the	brain.	These	various	
metaphors	or	lens	have	all	proved	insightful	in	different	ways.	The	problems	with	them	arise	
from	their	tendency	to	be	taken	up	as	‘nothing	but’	theories.	Dialogic	theory	says	that,	
where	we	really	do	not	know	something,	and	there	are	good	reasons	why	we	should	not	
pretend	to	ever	completely	understand	thinking,	then	the	‘truth’	is	unlikely	to	be	found	in	
any	one	metaphor	but	truth	as	an	aim	is	more	likely	to	be	advanced	by	having	a	range	of	
different	metaphors	in	dialogue	with	each	other.	This	is	the	polyphonic	version	of	truth	put	
forward	by	Bakhtin,	truth	as	a	direction	tended	towards	by	a	dialogue	of	multiple	
perspectives	and	not	as	something	that	can	be	found	in	a	single	voice	(Bakhtin,	1991).	This	is	
also	the	epistemology	of	transdisciplinarity	in	science		–	the	idea	that	the	truth		is	not	
normally	the	product	of	increasing	rigour	in	applying	a	single	model	but,	on	the	contrary,	
truth	is	often	best	found	in	flashes	of	insight	that	occur	across	and		between	different	
models,	metaphors	or,	more	generally,	different	points	of	view	(Nowotny	2004).		
	
Some	might	challenge	applying	the	metaphor	of	dialogue	to	thinking	by	saying	that	some	
individual	thinking	is	done	alone	and	in	silence.	However,	there	are	good	reasons	to	think	
that	this	silent	individual	thinking	takes	the	form	of	inner	dialogue	(Fernyhough,	2008).	
Sometimes	this	is	obvious	and	we	engage	in	an	explicit	dialogue	between	voices.	At	other	
times	the	inner	dialogue	is	significantly	transformed	from	outer	dialogue,	more	abbreviated	
and	grammatically	much	simplified	but	nonetheless	with	traces	that	indicate	its	origin	in	
social	interaction	(Fernyhough,	2008).	
Dialogue	as	a	metaphor	for	thinking	is	both	specific	and	general.	Specifically	it	draws	
attention	to	and	promotes	real	concrete	face	to	face	dialogues	in	classrooms	when	the	
thinking	is	found	in	the	speaking	or	the	gestures	and	the	movements	of	fingers	together	on	
a	screen.	More	generically	it	offers	a	new	way	of	thinking	about	the	relationship	between	
social	dialogues	and	silent	inner	thought	that	others	have	previously	imagined	as	non-
dialogic	or	as	quasi-mechanical	operations	in	the	brain	of	individuals.	The	way	that	small	
groups	work	together	to	solve	problems	and	to	pose	problems	is	already	thinking	(Woolley	
et	al	2010:	Stahl,	2009).	The	way	in	which	cultures,	societies	and	communities	respond	to	
challenges	and	design	together	for	a	collective	future	is	also	thinking	(cf	Dewey	on	the	
importance	of	‘social	intelligence’	1993,	p104).		
	
Learning	to	think	
	
According	to	Vygotsky	children	learn	to	think	as	individuals	by	internalising	cultural	sign-
tools	that	are	first	used	in	social	interaction.	Vygotsky	claimed	that	children	learnt	the	first	
sign,	pointing,	when	they	found	that	their	reaching	for	a	cup	or	a	toy	that	they	wanted	led	
their	mother	to	complete	the	gesture	by	giving	them	the	cup	or	the	toy.	As	Vygotsky	argues	
such	'sign-tools'	are,	at	one	and	the	same	time,	both	external	tools	and	internal	cognitive	
tools	guiding	our	cognitive	activity	(Vygotsky,	1987).	More	recent	empirical	research	on	how	
children	learn	to	point	suggests	that	Vygotsky	was	wrong.	His	account,	while	broadly	on	the	
right	lines,	misses	out	the	essential	dialogic	element	in	learning	to	think	or,	as	Tomosello	
puts	it	(2008),	the	important	caveat	that	intersubjective	relationships	have	to	proceed	signs	
and	language.	
Baron-Cohen	conducted	a	series	of	studies	on	infants	first	use	of	signs	and	he	argues,	from	
the	evidence,	that	to	understand	the	genesis	of	symbolizing	we	need	to	distinguish	between	
two	kinds	of	pointing:	just	pointing	to	get	what	you	want	(proto-imperative)	and	pointing	to	
draw	another’s	attention	to	something	(proto-declarative).	The	first	kind	of	pointing,	the	
kind	Vygotsky	referred	to,	does	not	imply	inter-subjective	awareness	and	so	is	not	the	
beginning	of	language	and	of	thinking.	Baron-Cohen	provides	convincing	evidence	that	
autistic	children	have	no	trouble	mastering	‘proto-imperative’	use	of	pointing	to	show	that	
they	want	something	even	when	they	fail	to	master	more	communicative	‘proto-
declarative’	use	of	pointing	as	a	sign	intended	to	direct	another’s	interest	(Baron-Cohen,	
1994).	The	concern	that	the	other	understands	the	sign	and	has	their	attention	
appropriately	directed	is	shown	only	when	the	child	follows	the	eyes	of	the	mother.	The	
significance	of	this	is	that	in	order	to	use	pointing	as	a	sign	it	is	necessary	first	to	have	a	
sense	of	the	other	person	as	someone	with	their	own	distinct	perspective	on	the	world.	
Thinking	then,	if	we	define	this	as	intentional	sign	use,	begins	with	drawing	others	to	pay	
attention	within	a	relationship	while	also	being	drawn	to	pay	attention	within	a	relationship.	
In	other	words	thinking	as	symbolic	sign	use,	begins	by	being	drawn	out	within	a	dialogic	
relationship	(Braten	and	Trevarthen,	2007).		
The	dialogic	relationship	behind	thinking	is	characterised	as	much	by	difference	as	by	unity.	
The	unity	can	be	found	in	the	coupling	of	two	entities	following	each	other’s	eye	gaze	to	
judge	each	other’s	intentions.	The	difference	is	why	things	need	to	be	pointed	out	by	signs	
in	the	first	place.	It	is	because	we	do	not	understand	each	other	and	do	not	know	what	each	
other	is	thinking	that	we	need	to	communicate	and	create	spaces	of	partially	shared	
meaning	that	are	also	spaces	of	thought.		
One	way	of	thinking	about	why	using	shared	signs	within	relationships	to	direct	each	other’s	
attention	leads	on	to	the	kind	of	complex	and	nuanced	thinking	that	Resnick	described	is	
through	the	idea	of	the	superaddressee	developed	by	Bakhtin	(1981).		This	is	the	idea	that	
having	two	perspectives	on	the	world,	one’s	own	and	someone	else’s	implies	a	third	
perspective,	the	perspective	of	the	relationship	itself	or	what	Bakhtin	referred	to	as	the	
superaddressee	or	also	as	the	witness	position	(1981).	The	child	does	not	learn	to	see	
herself	only	by	seeing	herself	reflected	in	the	eyes	of	her	mother,	she	learns	to	see	herself	
from	the	perspective	of	her	relationship	with	her	mother.	We	can	see	this	effect	clearly	if,	
when,	playing	alone	with	a	toy	car,	the	child	says	to	itself	'Sarah	can	drive'.	This	is	important	
to	understanding	how	thinking	is	not	just	being	called	out	in	a	specific	relationship,	for	
example	a	child's	relationship	with	her	mother,	but	also	in	relationship	with	a	world	or	the	
outside	in	general.	This	outside	point	of	view	is	really	present	in	thinking	in	the	form	of	an	
invisible	dialogue	partner.	This	world	or	outside	point	of	view	can	sometimes	seem	to	us	as	
if	it	was	a	fixed	context,	as	if	we	knew	where	and	when	the	child	was	situated,	but	it	does	
not	strike	the	child	as	a	fixed	context	but	rather	as	a	series	of	questions.			
	
Good	thinking	of	the	kind	we	want	to	teach	is	creative.	The	emergence	of	creative	thinking	
in	imaginative	play	is	described	well	by	Hobson	(2002)	as	an	inevitable	result	of	seeing	
things	from	two	points	of	view	in	relationship.	Once	the	child	discovers	that	the	same	thing,	
perhapsa	toy,	can	be	seen	in	one	way	by	the	child	and	in	another	way	but	her	mother	then	
it	becomes	possible	to	see	the	worod	as	a	set	of	perspectives	or,	as	Bakhtin	put	it,	to	see	
voices	in	everything.	A	toothpick	can	become	a	javelin	and	a	napkin	can	become	a	blanket	
for	a	doll.	The	world	has	a	thousand	voices	and	a	thousand	eyes.	Universal	metaphoriticy	is	
described	by	Merleau-Ponty	as	when	every	part	of	the	world	can	become	a	total	part	from	
which	to	see	and	‘understand’	the	rest	of	the	world.	That	advanced	thinking	also	remains	
rooted	in	this	more	primordial	experience	of	metaphoricity	is	now	a	widely	accepted	theory	
of	thinking	(Lakoff	and	Johnson,	2008).	
But	good	thinking	of	the	kind	we	want	to	teach	also	includes	criticality	which	is	about	using	
judgement	to	select	the	good	metaphors	and	reject	the	bad.	Judgement	begins	in	
responsibility	to	others.	First	the	child	needs	to	explain	herself	to	significant	others	such	as	
her	mother.	She	learns	that	she	cannot	say	just	anything,	she	learns	which	reasons	for	
actions	are	accepted	and	which	are	not.	The	next	key	stage	in	learning	to	think	is	marked	by	
the	use	of	the	term	accountability	in	the	successful		educational	programme	'Accountable	
Talk'.	This	is	about	accountability	to	standards	of	good	thinking	within	a	community.	In	
learning	to	think	for	ourselves	we	create	a	fictitious	dialogue	partner	which	could	be	alled	
'what	everybody	thinks'	-	a	personification	that	George	Herbert	mead	called	'the	
generalised	Other'.	The	Generalised	Other	is	your	community.	It	can	tell	you	whether	your	
thinking	is	good	or	bad	and	whether	or	not	you	are	following	the	appropriate	rules	for	
thinking.		
Creative	thinking	comes	from	discovering,	out	of	our	engagement	in	dialogic	relationships,	
that	everything	and	anything	can	be	experienced	as	a	kind	of	light	or	metaphor	for	
illuminating	the	world.	Critical	thinking	comes	from	internalising	the	judgements	of	others	
and	seeing	through	the	eyes	of	‘what	everyone	thinks’	in	order	to	select	down	from	the	
infinite	metaphoricity	of	things	to	the	few	pathways	of	meaning	that	are	appropriate	and	
useful	to	the	context.		On	the	whole	what	most	people	think	of	as	being	reasonable	or	being	
rational	remains	at	this	level	of	accountability	to	a	community.	But	increasingly	we	find	
ourselves	members	of	many	communities	and	they	do	not	always	agree	on	what	are	and	
what	are	not	the	rules	of	good	thinking.	This	leads	to	a	certain	responsibility	to	think	beyond	
our	community	or	an	accountability	to	what	Lingis	calls	‘the	community	of	those	who	have	
absolutely	nothing	in	common’	(1994).	Adapting	an	idea	from	the	French	philosopher	
Levinas	(1961)	I	have	referred	to	this	third	aspect	of	learning	to	think	as	dialogue	with	the	
Infinite	Other.	The	Infinite	Other	is	not	a	thing	or	a	real	person	but	it	manifests	as	a	kind	of	
voice	that	questions	us	and	disrupts	our	certainty.	For	every	community	it	is	possible,	if	you	
listen	closely	enough,	to	hear	a	voice	from	outside	the	community	challenging	its	claims	to	
rationality.	For	every	answer	there	is	always	a	further	question	in	an	infinite	regress.	The	
innovation	involved	in	the	concept	of	the	Infinite	Other	is	the	recognition	of	the	
phenomenological	reality	that	this	process	of	apparent	infinite	regress	can	manifest	as	if	it	
was	a	voice	in	a	dialogue4.	This	voice	from	the	outside	has	been	there	from	the	beginning,	
from	the	moment	the	child	learnt	to	say	‘Sara	can	drive	a	car’.	It	is	always	the	most	
important	voice	to	learn	to	listen	to	in	learning	how	to	think.	
	
																																								 																				
4	This	idea	that	an	infinite	regress	can	return	as	an	active	response	to	our	question	is	also	inspired	by	Hofsteder	
in	his	book,	Godel	Escher	Bach	(1980,	121).	He	refers	to	this	as	a	strange	loop	and	links	it	to	the	nature	of	
consciousness	(Hofstedter,	2007).	
Teaching	thinking	
The	word	‘teach’	comes	from	an	old	German	root	‘tǣcan’	which	means	to	point	out.	
Teaching	is	about	pointing	things	out.	It	is	only	possible	to	point	things	out	in	the	context	of	
a	relationship	where	you	can	follow	my	gaze	and	I	can	follow	yours.	So	teaching	involves	
first	building	a	relationship	and	then	directing	the	attention	of	students	within	the	context	
of	that	relationship.	If	we	want	to	teach	thinking	then	the	most	important	thing	to	point	out	
is	ignorance:	just	how	much	we	do	not	know.	Rather	than	simply	being	a	model	for	
ignorance,	by	asking	questions	a	teacher	can	serve	as	a	model	for	curiosity.		
Teaching	questioning	
People	might	say	that	questions	are	always	asked	in	a	context	and	are	always	questions	
about	something.	I	am	not	so	sure.	I	think	that,	independent	of	any	language	or	any	sign	
system	there	is	somehow	always	the	archetypal	question.	Not	a	questioning	of	this	or	that	
but	just	a	general	questioning.	This	is	perhaps	what	Heidegger	meant	with	his	‘fundamental	
question’	which	he	expressed	as	‘why	is	there	something	rather	than	nothing?’.	But	this	
fundamental	question	should	not	be	verbally	expressed,	it	is	not	a	specific	question,	it	is	
more	of	an	attitude.	This	attitude	is	one	of	curiosity	certainly	but	it	is	also	one	of	humility.	
The	point	is	that	however	much	we	think	we	know,	we	know	that	only	within	a	context,	the	
larger	encompassing	context	of	what	we	do	not	know,	including	the	many	things	that	we	do	
not	yet	even	know	that	we	do	not	know.	As	we	find	out	more	about	this	context	we	will	find	
that	we	have	to	re-interpret	all	the	things	that	we	think	we	know	meaning	that	really	we	do	
not	know	anything	at	all	for	certain.		
Whatever	you	point	out	to	learners	it	is	possible	to	point	it	out	in	a	way	that	closes	down	
the	fundamental	question	or	in	a	way	that	opens	it	up.	Knowledge,	as	this	is	taught	in	
schools,	is	only	the	dialogue	so	far	meaning	that	it	consists	only	of	answers	that	have	been	
given	to	questions	that	have	been	put.	Teaching	knowledge	as	the	story	of	a	dialogue	leaves	
a	space	for	the	learners	to	enter	into	that	ongoing	dialogue	themselves	as	thinkers	able	to	
ask	further	questions	and	so	to	find	further	answers.	In	this	way	anything	and	everything	
can	be	taught	as	an	invitation	to	join	a	dialogue	and	so	as	an	invitation	to	think	(Langer,	
2016).		
	
Opening,	widening	and	deepening	dialogic	space	
Constructivist	accounts	of	thinking	tend	to	emphasise	the	positive	ability	to	build	models	
and	systematically	apply	thinking	tools	(Holyoak	and	Morrison,	2015).	A	dialogic	approach	
lays	more	stress	on	what	the	poet	Keat’s	referred	to	as	‘negative	capability’	or	the	ability	to	
remain	in	uncertainty	until	a	creative	solution	emerges	(Keats,	1817).	The	idea	that	we	can	
teach	teaching	indirectly	simply	by	opening	a	space	for	reflection	can	be	illustrated	by	the	
extensive	evidence	on	the	value	of	introducing	pauses	into	teacher	student	interaction.	
Research	has	shown	clearly	that	the	quality	of	student’s	understanding	of	new	concepts	can	
be	increased	in	classrooms	simply	be	extending	the	length	of	time	that	teachers	pause	after	
asking	a	question	and	before	expecting	a	response	(Dillon,	1990).	Simply	pausing	after	
asking	a	question	is	a	good	illustration	of	what	it	might	mean	in	practice	to	teach	thinking	by	
opening	a	space.	
The	kind	of	talk	moves	promoted	in	dialogic	education	usually	include	asking	open	questions	
such	as	‘why	do	you	think	that?’.	Such	moves	do	not	work	as	positive	tools	to	co-construct	
meaning	but	as	a	negative	and	indirect	way	to	open	a	space	for	reflection	and	the	resonance	
of	multiple	voices	out	of	which	a	creative	response	might	(or	might	not)	emerge.		
Opening	a	dialogic	space	begins	with	a	relationship	within	which	it	is	possible	to	shape	the	
attention	of	the	other.	The	opening	teacher	move	is	drawing	attention	to	unknowing	by	
asking	a	question	or	posing	a	challenge.		In	some	cases	this	is	drawing	students	into	dialogue	
about	immediately	present	objects	or	issues	but	in	others	it	might	be	helping	to	graft	them	
onto	long	term	dialogues	of	the	culture	so	as	to	ask	questions	within	a	tradition,	question	
that	continue	that	tradition	and	take	it	further.	Widening	the	space	is	asking	everyone	what	
they	think	and	also	actively	seeking	out	a	range	fo	views	perhaps	by	going	to	the	internet	to	
find	alternatives	and	to	invite	in	different	voices.	Deepening	the	space	is	questioning	the	
frame	that	has	been	assumed	up	to	now,	asking	‘wat	are	the	assumptions	that	we	have	
taken	for	granted?	Are	we	sure	that	they	are	right?	Could	the	whole	area	or	issue	be	seen	
differently?’	
	
Dialogic	switch	in	perspective	
In	a	dialogue	we	sometimes	do	not	understand	the	other	person’s	point	of	view	initially	and	
have	to	work	to	re-construct	it	so	that	we	can	practice	inhabiting	it	ourselves.	This	switch	in	
perspective	to	facilitate	understanding	is	not	a	once	and	for	all	switch,	we	do	not	lose	our	
initial	perspective	in	making	the	switch,	but	it	is	more	about	being	able	to	hold	different	
perspectives	in	tension	together.	The	ease	with	which	children	can	make	this	switch	
depends	on	the	quality	of	their	relationships.	However	nicely	children	talk	together	to	ask	
each	other	questions	and	give	each	other	reasons	this	will	not	automatically	translate	into	
insight	unless	they	allow	themselves	to	switch	positions	with	other	speakers.	Such	switches	
do	not	only	occur	with	physically	present	voices	and	physically	present	tools	but	also	with	
virtual	cultural	voices,	for	example	the	virtual	voice	of	a	‘generalised	other’	(Mead,	1934)	or	
a	‘superaddressee’	(Bakhtin,	1981)	position	which	might	be	that	of,	for	example,	the	
personified	point	of	view	of	the	community	of	scientists	or	the	community	of	
mathematicians	(Kazak,	Wegerif,	&	Fujita,	2015).		
	
Identification	with	dialogue	
Different	ways	of	talking	in	classrooms	are	related	to	different	kinds	of	identification	
(Wegerif	and	Mercer	1997).	Where	children	identify	with	themselves	only	and	reject	the	
other	they	might	be	prone	to	what	Mercer	calls	‘disputational’	talk	(Mercer	and	Littleton,	
2007)	and	what	Habermas	refers	to	as	‘strategic’	reason	which	is	reasoning	that	does	not	
take	the	other	seriously	(Habermas,	1984).	However	when	they	identify	strongly	with	their	
group	they	might	be	prone	to	what	mercer	calls	‘cumulative	talk’	and	what	is	often	referred	
to	in	psychology	as	‘group	think’	(see	Brown,	this	volume)	which	is	when	the	harmony	of	the	
group	prevents	critical	questioning	and	good	reasoning.	Issues	of	identification	seem	
important	to	group	thinking	and	one	mechanism	of	successful	dialogic	thinking	might	be	
shifting	that	identification	away	from	all	static	bounded	objects,	be	that	an	image	of	the	self	
or	an	image	of	the	group,	onto	identification	with	the	open-ended	process	of	dialogue	itself.	
(Kumpulainen,	&	Rajala,	2017:	Ligorio,	2010;	Wegerif,	2011).	
	
Changing	the	culture	
Many	of	the	proposed	mechanisms	for	understanding	why	dialogic	education	works	are	
psychological,	focussing	on	changes	within	individuals.	But	individuals	are	shaped	within	
cultures.	One	way	to	understand	this,	informed	by	Rom	Harre’s	positioning	theory	(Harre,	
1999),	is	about	how	different	cultural	‘discourses’	offer	different	‘speaker	positions’.	In	
standard	classroom	cultures,	for	example,	students	are	often	positioned	as	not	being	able	to	
initiate	dialogues.	An	element	that	is	common	to	all	dialogic	education	approaches	is	a	
concern	to	address	behavioural	norms	directly	by	explicitly	questioning	old	norms	and	
teaching	new	norms	or	what	Mercer	calls	‘ground	rules’.	These	new	ground	rules	or	
behavioural	expectation	in	turn	shape	how	individuals	see	themselves	and	their	possibilities	
(Wegerif	2002).	Teaching	ground	rules	is	a	way	of	teaching	thinking	through	changing	the	
culture	such	that	a	different	experience	of	individual	agency	is	produced,	an	experience	that	
is	less	egotistical,	less	tribal	and	more	tolerant	of	uncertainty	and	multiplicity	because	open	
to	learning	from	the	others	and	from	otherness.	
		
Design	for	collective	global	intelligence	
Thinking	on	the	metaphor	of	dialogue	is	as	real,	if	not	more	real,	when	conducted	between	
people	in	small	groups	or	in	whole	cultures	than	in	the	internalised	form	of	silent	individual	
thought.	Designing	the	culture	of	classrooms	to	support	small	group	dialogue	is	one	way	to	
teach	thinking.	Designing	a	global	culture	that	thinks	together	better	is	another	way.	
Designing	for	social	intelligence	is	a	technical	issue	and	a	political	issue	as	well	as	being	an	
educational	issue	in	the	broad	sense.	Even	if	the	dialogues	of	oral	thinkers	in	oral	societies	
are	intelligent	they	do	not	tend	to	reach	very	far	in	their	influence	across	space	and	time	
simply	because	they	disappear	almost	as	soon	as	they	are	spoken	(Ong,	2013).	We	know	
that	the	dialogues	of	oral	thinkers	like	Socrates,	Gautama	Buddha	and	Confucius	were	
intelligent	because	their	followers	wrote	them	down.	Because	of	the	technology	of	literacy	
and	because	of	mass	education	policies	we	have	something	that	Oakeshott	(1961)	referred	
to	as	the	‘Conversation	of	Mankind’	and	the	associated	ideal	of	education	as	joining	this	
ongoing	conversation	or	dialogue.	Education	in	this	sense	depends	upon	technology,	the	
technology	of	literacy,	and	so	it	is	not	surprising	that	schools	focus	so	much	on	what	has	
been	called	the	3	‘R’s	=	reading,	writing	and	arithmetic.	The	advent	of	the	Internet	brings	
this	ongoing	dialogue	of	humanity	into	real-time.	Through	access	to	the	Internet	we	can	all	
potentially	participate	in	global	dialogues	that	respond	to	challenges	and	design	the	future	
together	as	well	as	building	shared	understanding	and	knowledge	in	every	area.	Realising	
this	new	potential	for	real-time	global	collective	intelligence	requires	teaching	thinking	as	a	
form	of	educational	design.	Literacy	is	a	communications	technology	that	does	not	work	
without	education.	Perhaps	the	same	is	true	of	dialogue	mediated	by	the	Internet.	The	
Internet	without	supporting	education	into	effective	dialogue	online	could	lead	to	increased	
stupidity	and	tribalism.	The	Internet	with	education	might	be	the	beginning	of	a	new	age:	
not	so	much	a	‘post	truth’	age	as	a	‘new	truth’	age	or	an	‘everyone	involved	in	creating	truth	
together’	age.	
	
Summary	and	conclusions	
The	metaphor	of	thinking	as	dialogue	leads	to	an	understanding	of	teaching	thinking	as	
drawing	students	into	dialogue.	This	has	some	overlap	with	other	models	of	teaching	
thinking	and	also	some	differences.	It	overlaps	in	seeking	to	produce	thinking	dispositions	
such	as	curiosity	and	thinking	strategies	such	as	asking	questions	and	reasoning.	The	main	
differences	stem	from	the	understanding	that	dialogue	between	people	and	dialogues	
carried	by	media	in	society	as	a	whole	is	already	thinking	such	that	silent	inner	thought	is	
just	a	modality	of	this	larger	dialogue.	One	aspect	of	teaching	thinking	is	to	be	concerned	to	
teach	individuals	to	think	through	internalising	dialogue	such	that	they	end	up	carrying	their	
own	inner	dialogic	space	around	with	them.	But	more	than	that	a	dialogic	approach	to	
teaching	thinking	is	concerned	to	open,	widen	and	deepen	shared	spaces	of	dialogue	in	the	
school	classroom	and	beyond.	A	dialogic	theory	of	teaching	thinking	suggests	that	it	is	
important	to	teach	cultures	to	think	as	well	as	individuals	and	ultimately	to	teach	our	
increasingly	global	society	to	think.	The	project	of	teaching	thinking	through	engaging	
students	in	dialogue	therefore	connects	a	focus	on	dialogues	in	classrooms	to	the	design	of	
educational	technologies,	including	pedagogies,	which	will	promote	and	sustain	a	more	
global	dialogue.	
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